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n November 2004, California voters 
approved a ten-year, US$3 billion 
stem cell research program to 
pursue cures for diabetes, Parkinson 
disease, spinal cord injuries, and 
other chronic conditions. Campaign 
organizers also claimed the state would 
receive royalties from new therapies, 
economic development in the form of 
jobs and taxes, and access to cheaper 
medicines [1]. Once the initiative 
passed, its proponents sought to scale 
back unrealistic voter expectations 
about rapid advances in the ﬁ  eld—
recent revelations of scientiﬁ  c fraud 
involving a prominent stem cell 
scientist will undoubtedly have that 
effect.
    Yet the goal that stem cell therapies 
resulting from the initiative will be 
made affordable for state residents 
remains in place. Toward that end, 
some California legislators are focusing 
on how the newly created California 
Institute for Regenerative Medicine 
(CIRM) should handle intellectual 
property (IP) generated by its grants. 
In August 2005, at CIRM’s request, 
the state-funded California Council 
on Science and Technology (CCST) 
recommended that CIRM adopt with 
minor variations the federal Bayh–Dole 
system [2].
    The 1980 Bayh–Dole Act gives 
research institutions the primary 
responsibility for maximizing the 
health- and economic-development 
beneﬁ  ts from government research 
funding. It encourages researchers or 
their institutions to patent inventions 
generated under government grants 
and transfer the technology to private 
ﬁ  rms. While the act gives the federal 
government the power to inﬂ  uence 
the affordability of the resulting 
technologies, it has never used this 
authority. The CCST report, embracing 
that stance, discouraged efforts to 
recoup revenue through high licensing 
fees and postponed a discussion of 
preferential pricing for state residents 
[3]. The report suggested such 
approaches would inevitably hinder 
the development of the public–private 
collaborations needed to bring new 
therapies to market.
    While regional governments 
frequently fund biomedical research 
in Europe, California is the ﬁ  rst state 
in the United States to embark on a 
large-scale program. The size of its 
commitment suggests that the state will 
be a major patron of stem cell research 
for years to come. This gives California 
a unique opportunity to create a 
climate that will not only be hospitable 
to innovation but also simultaneously 
deliver affordable medicine. The state 
government can do this by redeﬁ  ning 
how government, medical researchers, 
and the private sector interact. In 
doing so, it could serve as a model 
for reforming the US and global 
biomedical innovation systems.
    Change is necessary for two reasons. 
First, under the current system, new 
technologies, no matter how marginally 
effective, come to market at the highest 
prices. These advancing medical 
technologies are a major cause of 
rapidly rising health-care spending 
throughout the industrial world. 
Second, biomedical innovation in the 
US, long considered the global leader, 
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  Figure 1.   Applications for New Drug Approvals
      Asterisk indicates that new biologics applications were included in data for the ﬁ  rst time. 
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has slowed markedly in the past half 
decade. Despite escalating research 
spending in the public and private 
sectors, the number of new drugs and 
biologics recently approved by the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has fallen below previous eras (Figures 
1 and 2). And those new therapies that 
have been approved tend to have less 
signiﬁ  cance than medical advances 
of the past. While the popular press 
excitedly reports that breakthroughs in 
nanomedicine, targeted therapeutics, 
and genomic medicine are just around 
the corner, applications to launch 
clinical trials have fallen well below 
the levels of the early 1990s (Figure 3). 
Something beyond the usual culprit—
higher failure rates—is at work [4].
  Patent  Thickets
    The IP system may be contributing to 
the slowdown. The current innovation 
system encourages researchers to 
patent and commercialize discoveries 
that in an earlier era were considered 
basic science insights. This has led to 
an active market in the building blocks 
of further research, which can be 
anything from a genetic sequence or a 
cell receptor to the reagents needed to 
culture cells. This proliferation of basic 
science patents has raised the bar—
what economists call transaction costs—
for other researchers who want access 
to those research tools. While many 
researchers, especially in academia, 
ﬁ  nd ways around patent restrictions, 
and many companies have no trouble 
executing license agreements, there 
are cases where “patent thickets” have 
discouraged other researchers from 
pursuing similar or subsequent lines of 
inquiry [5]. 
    The stem cell ﬁ  eld, which is still 
years away from its ﬁ  rst approved 
therapy, has already experienced 
patent thicket problems. In May 2005, 
  Nature   drew attention to the case of 
Jeanne Loring, an embryologist at 
the Burnham Institute in La Jolla, 
California [6]. She claimed her start-
up ﬁ  rm collapsed when it couldn’t 
get access to embryonic stem cells at a 
reasonable price from the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation, which 
owns James Thomson’s seminal patents 
in embryonic stem cell research. 
The Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation has granted several 
exclusive licenses to Geron, Inc., which 
funded his work [7].
    A recent survey by the United 
Kingdom Stem Cell Initiative identiﬁ  ed 
nearly 18,000 stem cell patents issued 
around the world since 1994, with 
two-thirds issued in the US [8]. The 
Washington-based law ﬁ  rm of Sterne 
Kessler Goldstein and Fox has warned 
clients that “any company or research 
institution that plans to develop stem 
cells for therapeutic purposes may 
face a number of blocking patents and 
applications that will require licenses, 
if available” [9]. The potential for 
patent licensing restrictions to slow 
the pace of research is impossible to 
quantify, but surely exists. How does 
one count the decisions of researchers 
who eschew a line of research because 
they don’t want to bother securing the 
necessary licenses or material-transfer 
agreements? How does one count the 
decisions of researchers to avoid ﬁ  elds 
entirely because someone else has 
already locked up key inventions? How 
can one predict if cascading licensing 
fees will make downstream research 
prohibitively expensive? 
    Jumping into the Pool
    CIRM and other stem cell funders can 
become catalysts for cutting through 
this patent thicket. They can require 
that all grant recipients agree to 
donate the exclusive license to any 
insights, materials, and technologies 
that they patent to a common patent 
pool supervised by a new, nonproﬁ  t 
organization set up for that purpose. A 
patent pool serves as a one-stop shop 
where investigators can obtain no-cost 
or low-cost licenses for subsequent 
research. Patent pools have been 
successfully used in other high-
technology industries such as consumer 
electronics and software to facilitate 
the development of new technologies 
that either require common standards 
or rest on a common base of basic 
research. Several patent law ﬁ  rms and 
close observers of medical research 
have suggested that patent pools can 
work in biomedicine [9,10].
    There is already some ofﬁ  cial interest 
in the patent pool approach, at least for 
early stage research. The CCST report 
to CIRM suggested mechanisms such 
as broad-use licenses could be used 
to facilitate the sharing of software, 
databases, and other research tools 
(see page 14 in [2]). The UK Stem Cell 
Initiative, a public–private partnership, 
included a call for a new UK Stem Cell 
Cooperative “to maximize the cross-
fertilization between those involved 
in the subdisciplines of UK stem cell 
research” (see page 8 in [8]). 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030126.g002
  Figure 2.   New Drug Approvals at the FDA
      *Priority NMEs are new molecular entities that represent a signiﬁ  cant improvement compared with 
marketed products in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease.
    **Standard NMEs are new new molecular entities that appear to have therapeutic qualities similar 
to those of one or more already marketed drugs.
    ***Data through Nov 30, 2005.
    Note that in 2004, the FDA began including biologics in with its new drug approval data. These 
data have been excluded from this chart. In 2004, there were four priority biologics and one 
standard biologic approved by the FDA; in 2005 through November 30, 2005, there was one 
priority biologic and no standard biologics approved by the agency. 
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    But the stem cell patent pool needs 
to reach beyond the early stages of 
research if it is going to maximize 
the chances of this targeted research 
campaign eventually producing 
therapeutic results. As researchers 
move further down the development 
trail, the pool can serve as a 
clearinghouse for all researchers in 
the public or private sector to gain 
permissions for pursuing the next 
stage of their research at minimal 
transaction costs, including time. 
Moreover, the pool authority can act 
as an agent for resolving challenges 
that will inevitably arise as the research 
progresses, including enforcing ethical 
standards. For instance, the pool 
authority in cooperation with the FDA 
can set common standards for cell line 
preparations as research moves toward 
the critical clinical trial phase. And the 
pool should have the scale to leverage 
the cooperation of existing patent 
holders whose IP predates formation 
of the pool or whose future research 
will be funded by other governments, 
nonproﬁ  ts, or private ﬁ  rms.
    The pool can also inﬂ  uence 
accessibility to the fruits of downstream 
research. As a condition for obtaining 
a pool license, any researcher would 
have to contribute any IP that results 
from using the pool license back into 
the pool. In the software world, this 
is known as open-source licensing, 
which was used successfully to develop 
the still-evolving Linux computer 
operating system and which is being 
pursued in agricultural biotechnology 
(R. Jefferson, personal communication; 
[11]).
    There is one major stumbling block 
for the use of an open-source patent 
pool to facilitate stem cell research. 
Unlike software or even agriculture 
biotechnology—where the end 
products are relatively low cost, and 
the costs of development are relatively 
evenly distributed throughout the 
development process—biomedical 
research costs escalate once a 
therapeutically useful product reaches 
clinical trials. Applied research can 
take ﬁ  ve to ten years from the start of 
human safety experiments. While the 
costs of pharmaceutical research are 
less than the drug industry claims, the 
investment required can run into the 
tens or even hundreds of millions of 
dollars. As a result, this developmental 
research has almost always been funded 
by the private sector [12]. (There are, 
of course, many exceptions to this 
rule: the early HIV/AIDS medications, 
many cancer drugs, some vaccines, 
and the development of several rare-
disease therapies have been entirely 
funded by government agencies.) The 
private sector’s price for taking these 
late-stage risks is exclusive rights to the 
technology. Its reward, if successful, is 
the right to charge whatever the health-
care marketplace will bear. 
    Eyes on the Prize
    However, there is an alternative to the 
exclusive rights/high prices model used 
by conventional markets. A government 
body such as CIRM could establish 
a major prize for companies and 
institutions that collaborate to produce 
a successful stem cell therapy. The prize 
would have to be large enough to justify 
the substantial investment required to 
carry out the ﬁ  nal stages of research. It 
would also have to be large enough to 
share with the upstream patent holders 
whose basic and applied research 
became part of the pool that led to 
the new therapy. One could imagine 
prizes in the billions of dollars based on 
considerations such as the prevalence 
and public health impact of the disease, 
the difﬁ  culty in developing its cure, 
and the capital investment required to 
achieve results. A prize system has been 
proposed at the federal level [13].
    A prize system, coupled with an 
open-source patent pool, is entirely 
consistent with the existing IP system. 
Inventors and their institutions would 
retain the IP rights to their inventions. 
Any revenues generated from the prize 
could be shared with the inventor and 
reinvested in research and education. 
Though the rights to the invention 
would be turned over to the pool, 
the technology-transfer ofﬁ  cials at an 
institution would still have an incentive 
(their share of the prize) to aggressively 
pursue its use by downstream scientists 
in the public or private sectors if 
they feel their invention is not being 
properly utilized.
    Division of the prize could be based 
on mandatory arbitration among 
patent holders [14]. Or it could be 
based on the value of the research 
contracts that led to the underlying 
IP and were invested in clinical trials. 
Basing the prize on investment would 
weight its distribution toward the 
parties that conducted the ﬁ  nal phases 
of research—usually private-sector 
ﬁ  rms—since the trials are generally 
the most expensive part of therapeutic 
development. 
    Governments can ﬁ  nance the prizes 
using tax-exempt bonds since a prize 
will only be awarded for success. At 
that point, the bonds can be repaid 
by a surcharge on each use of the new 
therapy as it rapidly diffuses through 
the health-care system. Once the prize 
has been awarded for a successfully 
developed stem cell therapy, the pool 
authority can grant licenses to one or 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030126.g003
  Figure 3.   Applications to Begin Human Clinical Trials
      Asterisk indicates that investigative new drug applications for therapeutic biologic products were 
included for the ﬁ  rst time. 
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more generic manufacturing ﬁ  rms, 
which can then compete to sell the 
therapy to health-care providers and 
the public on a cost-plus basis [15].
    Wouldn’t the surcharge to ﬁ  nance 
the prize, when added to the cost-plus 
production by generic manufacturers, 
add up to the same high prices for 
medicines generated by the current 
system? Not at all. This “shared prize 
model,” calibrated to the true cost of 
research and development, eliminates 
the 30%–40% of pharmaceutical 
industry revenue generated by wasteful 
marketing costs. The prize provides 
no rewards for industry research and 
development that goes to develop 
medicines that duplicate the action 
of medicines already on the market. 
Financing the prize with tax-exempt 
bonds ensures that the surcharge will 
be based on the lowest-cost capital 
available.
  Conclusion
    By combining a patent pool, an open-
source model of IP development, and 
a shared prize system for developing 
stem cell therapies, the California state 
stem cell program can point the way 
to a new medical innovation system 
for the 21st century. This model could 
be used by all advanced industrial 
economies grappling with how to pay 
for the rising cost of the new medical 
technologies sought by their ill and 
aging populations.   
May 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 5  |  e126
  References
    1.  Baker L, Deal B (2004) Economic impact 
analysis: Proposition 71 California Stem Cell 
Research and Cures Initiative. New York: 
Analysis Group. Available: http:⁄⁄www.ag-inc.
com/AnalysisGroup/uploadedFiles/News_
and_Events/News/Proposition_71_report.pdf. 
Accessed 1 February 2006.
    2.  California Council on Science and Technology 
[CCST] Intellectual Property Study Group 
(2005) Policy framework for intellectual 
property derived from stem cell research in 
California. Interim report to the California 
legislature, governor of the state of California 
and the California Institute for Regenerative 
Medicine. Riverside (California): CCST. 
Available: http:⁄⁄www.ccst.us/ccst/pubs/
IP/IP%20Interim%20Exec.pdf. Accessed 1 
February 2006.
    3.  US Food and Drug Administration [FDA] 
(2005) Original INDs received calendar 
years 1986–2004. Rockville (Maryland): FDA. 
Available: http:⁄⁄www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/
Cyindrec.htm. Accessed 1 February 2006. 
    4.  Heller MA, Eisenberg RS (1998) Can patents 
deter innovation? The anticommons in 
biomedical research. Science 698–701.
    5.  Eisenberg R (2001) Bargaining over the 
transfer of proprietary research tools: Is this 
market failing or emerging? In: Dreyfuss 
RC, editor. Expanding the boundaries of 
intellectual property: Innovation policy for the 
knowledge society. Oxford University Press. pp. 
223–250.
    6.  Wadman M (2005) Licensing fees slow 
advance of stem cells. Nature. E-pub 18 May 
2005. Available: http:⁄⁄www.nature.com/
news/2005/050516/pf/435272a_pf.html. 
Accessed 1 February 2006.
    7.  Geron (5 November 1998) PNAS reports 
derivation of human pluripotent stem 
cells from cultured primordial germ cells. 
Menlo Park (California): Geron. Available: 
http:⁄⁄www.geron.com/pressview.asp?id=562. 
Accessed 1 February 2006.
    8.  UK Stem Cell Initiative (2005) Report and 
recommendations. London: UK Department of 
Health. Available: http:⁄⁄www.advisorybodies.
doh.gov.uk/uksci/uksci-reportnov05.pdf. 
Accessed 1 February 2006.
    9.  Ebersole TJ, Edmond RW, Schwartzman 
RA (2005) Stem cells—Patent pools to the 
rescue? Washington (D. C.): Sterne Kessler 
Goldstein and Fox. Available: http:⁄⁄www.skgf.
com/media/news/news.176.PDF. Accessed 1 
February 2006.
    10.  Kesselheim AS, Avorn J (2005) University-
based science and biotechnology products: 
Deﬁ  ning the boundaries of intellectual 
property JAMA 850–854. 
    11. Pollack A (10 February 2005) Open-source 
practices for biotechnology. New York Times 
B: 1. 
    12. Goozner M (2004) The $800 million pill: The 
truth behind the cost of new drugs. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 296 p.
    13. US Congress (2005) Summary of the 
medical innovation prize fund, HR 417. 
109th Congress. 1st session (26 January 
2005). Available: http:⁄⁄bernie.house.gov/
documents/prescriptions/rd_read_the_bill.
htm. Accessed 3 February 2006.
    14. Kesselheim A, Avorn J (2005) University-based 
science and biotechnology products: deﬁ  ning 
the boundaries of intellectual property. JAMA 
293: 850–854.
    15. Barton JH, Emanuel EJ (2005) The patents-
based pharmaceutical development process: 
Rationale, problems and potential reforms. 
JAMA 294: 2075–2082. 